Prem Prakash v. Union of India through Directorate of Enforcement 2024 INSC 637

 Case name: Prem Prakash v. Union of India through Directorate of Enforcement

Citation: 2024 INSC 637; Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 5416 of 2024, Supreme Court of India​

Date of judgment: 28 August 2024​

Bench / Judges: B. R. Gavai and K. V. Viswanathan, JJ. (judgment by K. V. Viswanathan, J.)​

 

Facts

An FIR (Sadar P.S. Case No. 399 of 2022, Ranchi) alleged that a one‑acre plot at Cheshire Home Road, Ranchi, was fraudulently acquired through forged title documents and sham sale transactions involving various accused; the FIR did not name Prem Prakash. Since sections 420 and 467 IPC are scheduled offences, the Enforcement Directorate (ED) registered ECIR No. 5 of 2023 under the PMLA. ED alleged that ₹1.01 crore out of the sale consideration flowed, via accounts of Punit Bhargava, to M/s Jamini Enterprises, said to be beneficially owned by Prem Prakash, and that he used his connections to get the land mutated and facilitate the deal. He was arrayed as A‑8, arrested on 11 August 2023 (while already in custody in another ECIR), and his bail application under section 45 PMLA was rejected by the Special Court and by the Jharkhand High Court.​

 

Judgment / Holding

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court’s order dated 22 March 2024, and directed that Prem Prakash be released on bail in ECIR No. 5 of 2023 on furnishing a bond of ₹5 lakh with two sureties, subject to conditions (surrender of passport, weekly reporting to the IO, and non‑tampering with evidence). Applying section 45 PMLA in light of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and Manish Sisodia (II), the Court held that there were reasonable grounds to believe the appellant was not guilty of the alleged money‑laundering offence and was not likely to commit any offence while on bail, particularly given over a year’s incarceration, non‑commencement of trial, and weak material linking him to the forged sale deed or “proceeds of crime.”​

 

Key observations

• The Court reaffirmed that even under PMLA “bail is the rule, jail the exception,” as a facet of Article 21, and that section 45 imposes stringent but not absolute restraints; courts at the bail stage need only form a prima facie view on “reasonable grounds for believing” based on probabilities, not proof beyond reasonable doubt.​
• It stressed that under section 24 PMLA the prosecution must first establish three foundational facts (existence of scheduled crime, derivation of property as proceeds of crime, and the accused’s involvement in a process or activity connected with such proceeds) before the statutory presumption and twin conditions can operate.​
• The Court held that statements of the appellant recorded under section 50 PMLA while he was already in judicial custody in another ED case are hit by section 25 of the Evidence Act and cannot be used against him, and that co‑accused statements (e.g., Afshar Ali, Saddam Hussain) have only limited corroborative value akin to section 30 Evidence Act.​

 

Obiter dicta

• The judgment clarifies that when a person is in custody in one PMLA case, any statement the same agency records under section 50 in another ECIR cannot safely be treated as voluntary; to admit it against the maker would offend fair‑procedure requirements under Article 21 and the protective logic of section 25 Evidence Act.​
• It emphasises the importance of detailed, case‑specific counter‑affidavits by ED in bail matters, explaining how the three foundational facts are made out, rather than relying on generic assertions; only then can the presumption under section 24 shift the burden to the accused.​
• Relying on recent PMLA bail decisions, the Court reiterates that prolonged pre‑trial custody, especially where trial is nowhere near conclusion and the case does not involve extreme offences or massive public victimisation, should weigh heavily in favour of conditional liberty; pre‑trial detention must not become “punishment without trial.”​

Pravin C. Shah v. K. A. Mohd. Ali and Another Civil Appeal No. 3050 of 2000; reported as (2001) 8 SCC 650

 

Case name: Pravin C. Shah v. K. A. Mohd. Ali and Another

Citation: Civil Appeal No. 3050 of 2000; reported as (2001) 8 SCC 650​

Date of judgment: 9 October 2001​

Bench / Judges: K. T. Thomas and S. N. Variava, JJ. (judgment by K. T. Thomas, J.)​

 

Facts

The respondent, an advocate practising in Ernakulam, was twice found guilty of criminal contempt by the Kerala High Court and convicted under section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, with fines imposed; his challenges in the Supreme Court failed save for deletion of one fine, and his apology was expressly rejected. Despite this, he continued to appear and argue cases. On a complaint by a residents’ association represented by the appellant, the Bar Council of Kerala initiated disciplinary proceedings and ordered that he be debarred from acting or pleading in any court until he purged himself of contempt as per Rule 11 of the Kerala High Court Rules under section 34(1) of the Advocates Act. The Bar Council of India, on appeal, set aside this order, holding Rule 11 inapplicable as it allegedly usurped Bar Council powers. The association appealed to the Supreme Court.​

 

Judgment/Holdingthe 

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and restored the effect of Rule 11, holding that it is a self‑operating rule framed by the High Court to regulate appearance and conduct of advocates in court and does not trench upon the Bar Councils’ disciplinary jurisdiction over the right to practise. Once an advocate is found guilty of contempt, his right to appear, act or plead in any court within the High Court’s jurisdiction stands automatically suspended until he purges himself of contempt by genuine remorse and acceptance of apology by the competent court; mere undergoing of sentence or payment of fine is insufficient. The Bar Council of India erred in treating Rule 11 as unconstitutional or as an encroachment on its autonomy; courts retain supervisory control over who appears before them to protect their dignity and orderly functioning. The Court directed Registrars to inform all subordinate courts whenever an advocate is convicted for contempt so that the interdict is enforced until purge.​

 

Key observations

• The Court distinguished between the “right to practise” (a broader genus regulated by Bar Councils, including drafting, advising, etc.) and the “right to appear and conduct cases in court” (a species subject to the court’s own control via rules under section 34 Advocates Act).​
• Rule 11 concerns only in‑court appearance of an advocate found guilty of contempt; it does not impose disciplinary punishment or affect chamber practice, so it does not violate Articles 14, 19(1)(g) or 21.​
• Purging contempt in criminal contempt cases requires more than completion of sentence: it needs real contrition, a sincere apology accepted by the court through an order acknowledging purge; only then does the bar on appearance cease.​

 

Obiter dicta

• The judgment stresses that allowing a recently convicted contemnor to stand and argue in the same courts, “unaffected” by his contumacious conduct, would erode public confidence, corrode the court’s majesty, and undermine the justice system; hence courts must retain strict control over courtroom conduct.​
• It explains that disciplinary powers of Bar Councils (suspending or removing an advocate’s licence) and courts’ contempt powers (including restricting appearance until purge) are “separate and distinct” jurisdictions, both validly co‑existing under Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India.​
• The Court clarifies that apologies offered merely as a device to avoid punishment, without genuine remorse, do not amount to purging contempt, citing earlier cases like M. Y. Shareef, Mulk Raj, and M. B. Sanghi, and that “soft justice” in such situations is inappropriate.​

Nandini Satpathy v. P. L. Dani and Another (1978) 2 SCC 424

 Case name: Nandini Satpathy v. P. L. Dani and Another

Citation: (1978) 2 SCC 424; AIR 1978 SC 1025; (1978) 3 SCR 608​

Date of judgment: 7 April 1978​

Bench / Judges: V. R. Krishna Iyer, J. (delivering the judgment of the Court), with Jaswant Singh and V. D. Tulzapurkar, JJ. on the Bench​

 

Facts

Nandini Satpathy, former Chief Minister of Odisha, was named as an accused in a vigilance FIR alleging possession of assets disproportionate to known sources of income and offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act and sections 161, 165, 120‑B and 109 IPC. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance, summoned her to the police station (contrary to section 160 CrPC’s protection for women) and gave her a long written questionnaire to be answered orally under section 161 CrPC. She declined to answer many questions, invoking Article 20(3) (right against self‑incrimination) and section 161(2) CrPC. The officer then filed a complaint under section 179 IPC (refusal to state the truth to a public servant), the Magistrate took cognizance, and the High Court refused to quash. She appealed to the Supreme Court.​

 

Judgment / Holding

The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and quashed the section 179 IPC prosecution, holding that the protection against self‑incrimination in Article 20(3) extends to police interrogation and substantially overlaps with the immunity in section 161(2) CrPC. It ruled that “any person” in section 161 includes an accused or suspect, and that questions whose answers have a “reasonable and real” tendency to expose the person to a criminal charge (in the same or other pending/imminent cases) may be refused. The Court emphasised that section 179 IPC contains a mens rea element and should not be used promiscuously to coerce answers where an accused reasonably claims constitutional immunity. Given the unclear state of law and her counsel’s undertaking that she would answer all non‑incriminatory questions, the Court directed that she be examined only in terms of the section 160 proviso (at her residence) and that the prosecution be quashed.​

 

Key observations

• Article 20(3) applies not only at trial but from the stage of police investigation; “to be a witness against himself” covers any compelled testimony, not just formal court evidence, and includes answers that provide a real link in the chain of proof towards guilt, not merely full confessions.​
• Section 161(2) CrPC is treated as a “parliamentary gloss” on Article 20(3): both protect against compelled answers that have a reasonable tendency to expose a person to a criminal charge, including in other proceedings, while still obliging truthful answers to genuinely non‑incriminatory relevant questions.​
• The Court strongly criticises third‑degree methods and “psychic” or subtle pressure in police stations, stressing that compulsion under Article 20(3) includes mental and environmental coercion, and that women cannot be required to attend police stations under section 160 CrPC; breach merits disciplinary action.​

 

Obiter dicta

• The Court suggests that, while the police are not required to provide a lawyer, if an accused requests the presence of counsel during “near‑custodial” interrogation, that facility should normally be allowed; lawyers may quietly advise but not “harangue” the police, and their presence helps ensure observance of the right to silence.​
• It recommends practical safeguards: informing the accused of the right to silence and recording that warning; and, where no lawyer is available, taking the accused after questioning to a Magistrate, doctor or responsible independent person for a confidential audience to report any duress, with a brief record sent to a Magistrate rather than the police.​
• The judgment articulates that suspects “embryonically” accused in other serious investigations may reasonably fear self‑incrimination from otherwise neutral questions, and courts must consider the full factual matrix and give the benefit of reasonable doubt in favour of the privilege, while rejecting fanciful or remote apprehensions.​
  
  

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248

 

Case name: Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India

Citation: (1978) 1 SCC 248; AIR 1978 SC 597; (1978) 2 SCR 621​

Date of judgment: 25 January 1978​

Bench / Judges: M. Hameedullah Beg, C.J., and Y. V. Chandrachud, P. N. Bhagwati, V. R. Krishna Iyer, N. L. Untwalia, Syed Murtaza Fazal Ali and P. S. Kailasam, JJ. (leading judgment by Bhagwati, J.; concurring opinions by others)​

 

Facts

Maneka Gandhi was issued an Indian passport on 1 June 1976 under the Passports Act, 1967. On 2 July 1977, the Regional Passport Officer informed her that the Government of India had decided to impound her passport under section 10(3)(c) “in public interest” and required her to surrender it within seven days. When she asked for the reasons under section 10(5), the Government replied that, “in the interest of the general public,” the statement of reasons would not be furnished. She filed a writ petition under Article 32 challenging the constitutional validity of sections 10(3)(c) and 10(5), the impounding order, and the denial of reasons, alleging violations of Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 19(1)(g) and 21 and breach of natural justice.​

 

Judgment / Holding

The Court held that the “right to travel abroad” is part of “personal liberty” under Article 21, so deprivation of that right must follow a law which prescribes a procedure that is fair, just and reasonable, not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive. Overruling the earlier “watertight compartment” view in A. K. Gopalan, it held that laws affecting personal liberty must also satisfy Articles 14 and 19: Article 21’s “procedure established by law” is controlled by the requirements of non‑arbitrariness and reasonableness. Section 10(3)(c) and section 10(5) were upheld on a constitution‑conforming interpretation: power to impound must be exercised on relevant grounds, with an opportunity of hearing (pre‑ or promptly post‑decisional), and reasons must normally be disclosed, refusal being justified only in rare cases where disclosure itself would harm interests expressly protected in the statute. In Maneka Gandhi’s specific case, the Court found denial of reasons and absence of hearing inconsistent with fair procedure and quashed the impounding order, but, in view of an undertaking given by the Attorney General to provide a hearing and reconsider, disposed of the petition without a formal writ, directing that the passport remain with the Court pending governmental reconsideration.​

 

Key observations

• The Court gave Article 21 a wide meaning: “personal liberty” is of the “widest amplitude” and includes a range of rights (like the right to travel abroad), some separately protected in Article 19; Articles 14, 19 and 21 form an integrated scheme, and any law depriving liberty must be “right, just and fair,” and non‑arbitrary.​
• It rejected the “direct object” test of Gopalan and adopted the “direct and inevitable effect” / “intended and real effect” doctrine (building on R. C. Cooper and Bennett Coleman), holding that State action must be tested for its real impact on fundamental rights rather than its form or ostensible purpose.​
• The Court also held that freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a), and the right to practice a profession under Article 19(1)(g), are not geographically confined to India; State action within India that prevents expression or professional activity abroad can still violate these rights.​

 

Obiter dicta

• The judgment elaborates that Articles 19 and 21 are not mutually exclusive; in “unoccupied” areas of personal liberty outside Article 22, both substantive and procedural law must satisfy Articles 14 and 19, not only the bare text of Article 21.​
• It affirms that principles of natural justice apply not only to quasi‑judicial but also to administrative actions affecting rights: even where statutes are silent, a duty to act fairly and give a reasonable opportunity to be heard will normally be implied, subject only to exceptional situations of genuine urgency where a prompt post‑decisional hearing may suffice.​
• Multiple opinions warn against broad, unguided executive discretions in matters like passports, emphasising transparency, recorded reasons, and judicial review as safeguards against arbitrary or politically motivated restrictions on movement, expression and profession.​

Joginder Singh v. State (Delhi Administration) (1994) 4 SCC 724

 

Case name: Joginder Singh v. State (Delhi Administration)

Citation: (1994) 4 SCC 724; also noted at (1994) 3 SCC 569; JT 1994 (2) SC 423​

Date of judgment: 19 April 1994​

Bench / Judges: S. C. Agrawal, J. and A. S. Anand, J.​

 

Facts

The appellant, Joginder Singh, was prosecuted before the Designated Court, Delhi, for an offence punishable under section 5 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (TADA), relating to unauthorised possession of specified arms or ammunition in notified areas. The Designated Court convicted him under section 5 TADA and sentenced him to five years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000, with two months’ further RI in default. In an appeal to the Supreme Court, the main contention was that his conviction could not be sustained in view of the interpretation of Section 5 TADA by the Constitution Bench in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab.​

 

Judgment / Holding

The Court noted that in Kartar Singh, R. M. Sahai, J. had taken the view that section 5 of TADA can be invoked only if there is material to show that the arms or ammunition were likely to be used for, or had been used in, terrorist or disruptive activities, while the other four Judges did not expressly decide the precise scope of section 5. Observing that the issue of the correct interpretation of section 5 TADA arises in a large number of cases and is of considerable importance, the Court did not finally decide the appeal but directed that the question of the true ambit of section 5 TADA be placed before a three‑judge bench for authoritative determination, granting liberty to mention the appeal for hearing after such reference.​

 

Key observations

• The order records that there is uncertainty whether the restrictive construction of section 5 TADA by Sahai, J., in Kartar Singh represents the binding ratio of the Constitution Bench, since the remaining Judges did not concur or elaborate on that point.​
• Recognising the widespread impact of section 5 TADA prosecutions, the Court emphasises the need for a clear, larger‑bench ruling rather than resolving the issue in a two‑judge bench appeal, thereby prioritising doctrinal clarity over immediate disposal.​

 

Obiter dicta

• Implicit in the order is the principle that when different opinions emerge from a larger Bench on an important statutory provision, and its application affects numerous pending cases, a smaller Bench should refer the question for reconsideration or clarification rather than adopt one view without full discussion.​
• The Court’s approach reflects a cautionary stance in applying severe special‑statute provisions like TADA without a settled interpretation, signalling the importance of strict construction and robust precedent in matters involving serious curtailment of personal liberty.​

Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and Others v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 565

 Case name: Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and Others v. State of Punjab

Citation: (1980) 2 SCC 565; AIR 1980 SC 1632; 1980 (3) SCR 383​

Date of judgment: 9 April 1980​

Bench / Judges: Y. V. Chandrachud, C.J., and P. N. Bhagwati, N. L. Untwalia, R. S. Pathak and O. Chinnappa Reddy, JJ. (judgment by Chandrachud, C.J.)​

 

Facts

Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia, then Punjab Minister for Irrigation and Power, and others faced grave allegations of political corruption and anticipated arrest on non‑bailable charges including criminal breach of trust. They moved the Punjab & Haryana High Court under section 438 CrPC seeking anticipatory bail. A Full Bench dismissed their applications and, in the process, laid down eight restrictive propositions: that section 438 power is “extraordinary,” to be used only in exceptional cases; that conditions of section 437 are implicit; that “special case” must be shown; that anticipatory bail is virtually barred in life‑sentence offences and serious economic offences, and cannot be granted on mere general allegations of mala fides. Multiple appeals by special leave came before the Supreme Court.​

 

Judgment / Holding

The Supreme Court substantially set aside the Full Bench ruling and held that section 438 confers a broad discretionary power on the High Court and Court of Session which must not be cut down by importing section 437 limitations or the High Court’s rigid propositions. It ruled that anticipatory bail is a statutory, pre‑arrest protection of personal liberty, not confined to “exceptional cases,” and that courts must decide case‑by‑case using usual bail considerations (nature of accusation, antecedents, risk of absconding, tampering, public interest), imposing suitable conditions under section 438(2). The Court clarified that anticipatory bail can be granted even before FIR (if reasonable apprehension of arrest exists), or after FIR till arrest, but not after arrest, when sections 437/439 apply. The appeals were allowed in part and the restrictive Full Bench propositions disapproved.​

 

Key observations

• Section 438 is a procedural safeguard intimately linked to Article 21; since denial of bail is deprivation of liberty, courts must “lean against” unnecessary judicial restrictions not found in the text, otherwise the provision risks constitutional invalidity.​
• The Court rejected a rigid requirement that anticipatory bail be confined to mala fide accusations, or that it be barred in offences punishable with death or life imprisonment; instead, discretion must remain flexible, guided but not fettered by general bail principles.​
• A “blanket” anticipatory bail order (covering all future offences or unspecified accusations) is impermissible; the order must be tied to specific apprehended offences, to avoid becoming a charter of lawlessness or disabling police investigation.​

 

Obiter dicta

• The judgment stresses that judicial discretion in bail matters should not be strait‑jacketed by judge‑made “codes”; broad guidelines may be framed but life’s variability requires leaving “free play in the joints” for higher courts to respond to unforeseen situations.​
• It emphasises that anticipatory bail does not impede investigation: conditions can ensure cooperation, prevent tampering, and even allow limited police custody for discoveries under section 27 of the Evidence Act, preserving the complementary roles of police and judiciary.​
• The Court cautions against class‑based assumptions (that the rich will stay, the poor will abscond) and reaffirms that equality before law requires bail decisions to focus on objective risk factors, not status, even while acknowledging that misuse of criminal law for political vendetta justifies the availability of anticipatory bail.​

Shri D. K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997) 1 SCC 416

 Case name: Shri D. K. Basu v. State of West Bengal; Ashok K. Johri v. State of U.P. 

Citation: (1997) 1 SCC 416; judgment dated 18 December 1996​

Date of judgment: 18 December 1996​

Bench / Judges: Kuldip Singh and A. S. Anand, JJ. (judgment by Dr A. S. Anand, J.)​

 

Facts

The Executive Chairman of Legal Aid Services, West Bengal, wrote to the Chief Justice of India in August 1986 highlighting newspaper reports of increasing deaths and torture in police custody, seeking development of “custody jurisprudence” and modalities for compensation and accountability. The letter was treated as a PIL writ petition under Article 32; soon after, another letter from Ashok Kumar Johri about a custodial death in Aligarh was also tagged. Notices issued to all States and the Law Commission produced affidavits and the 113th Report on “injuries in police custody.” The Court examined the extent of police powers of arrest, detention and interrogation and the constitutional protection against custodial violence under Articles 21 and 22.​

 

Judgment / Holding

The Court held that custodial torture and deaths violate Articles 21 and 22 and that no person loses fundamental rights on arrest; only reasonable restrictions “according to procedure established by law” are permitted. It laid down 11 mandatory requirements to be followed in all arrests and detentions (such as arrest memo with witness, notice to family, diary entries, periodic medical examination, police control room intimation, and limited right to meet a lawyer), declaring that these flow from Articles 21 and 22 and are binding on all police and similar agencies. The Court also affirmed that for established violations of Article 21 in custody, public law monetary compensation is available against the State on a strict‑liability basis, in addition to civil and criminal remedies, and that sovereign immunity is no defence.​

 

Key observations

• The Court described custodial violence as a “naked violation of human dignity” that strikes at the rule of law, and noted the practical difficulties of prosecuting police personnel because evidence lies within police control and witnesses fear retaliation.​
• Relying on earlier cases like Rudul Sah, Nilabati Behera, Bhim Singh and Saheli, and comparative jurisprudence from Ireland, Trinidad & Tobago and New Zealand, the Court developed a robust public law remedy: courts must not stop at declaratory relief but can grant compensation directly under Articles 32/226 for unconstitutional deprivation of life or liberty.​
• The Court urged Parliament to consider inserting section 114‑B in the Evidence Act (as suggested by the Law Commission) to presume police responsibility for injuries in custody, and emphasized the need for police training, transparency, and scientific methods of investigation instead of “third‑degree methods.”​

 

Obiter dicta

• The Court acknowledged the genuine challenge posed by terrorism and serious crime, but stressed that “state terrorism is no answer to combat terrorism” and that even hardened offenders cannot be subjected to torture; interrogation must remain “right, just and fair” and within legal bounds.​
• It highlighted that protection against torture applies not only to police but also to other enforcement agencies like DRI, Enforcement Directorate, BSF, CRPF, CBI, etc., and that the D. K. Basu requirements equally bind them.​
• The judgment articulates an important obiter that public law compensation for violations of fundamental rights is based on strict liability, with a right of the State to recover from the individual wrongdoer, and that traditional private‑law notions and sovereign immunity cannot limit the Court’s constitutional role as protector of fundamental rights.​

Divine Retreat Centre v. State of Kerala and Others Appeal (Criminal) No. 472 of 2008

 Case name: Divine Retreat Centre v. State of Kerala and Others

Citation: Appeal (Criminal) No. 472 of 2008, arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2234 of 2007; reported as (2008) 3 SCC 542

Date of judgment: 11 March 2008

Bench / Judges: S. H. Kapadia and B. Sudershan Reddy, JJ. (judgment by B. Sudershan Reddy, J.)

 

Facts

A remand prisoner, Mini Varghese, alleged that while staying at Divine Retreat Centre, she was sexually exploited by a priest (Father Mathew Thadathil), became pregnant, and was later falsely implicated in a theft case. On her petition, the Magistrate ordered an investigation and Crime No. 381 of 2005 under section 376(g) IPC was registered at Koratty Police Station. Separately, an anonymous petition with media clippings and CDs alleging sexual offences, suspicious deaths, foreign exchange violations and involvement of senior IAS/IPS officers at the Centre reached a High Court Judge. Treating it suo motu under section 482 CrPC, the Kerala High Court removed the Investigating Officer, constituted a Special Investigation Team headed by an IG, and ordered wide-ranging inquiries into alleged crimes and corruption.

 

 

Judgment / Holding

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court’s order constituting the Special Investigation Team and the wider directions based on the anonymous petition. It held that under section 482 CrPC the High Court cannot change the Investigating Officer or create its own investigating agency mid‑investigation, especially on vague, anonymous allegations, and that investigation of cognizable offences is the statutory domain of the police subject to limited judicial control. The Court directed that materials collected by the SIT be handed to the original Investigating Officer, who must file an appropriate report under section 173 CrPC for the Magistrate’s judicial consideration.

Key observations

• The judgment reiterates that section 482 CrPC does not confer any new or unlimited power; it merely preserves inherent jurisdiction to: (i) give effect to orders under the Code, (ii) prevent abuse of process, and (iii) secure the ends of justice. Exercise must be sparing, cautious, and cannot be used to supervise or take over a police investigation.
• The Court emphasises the clear separation between police powers of investigation under Chapter XII CrPC and judicial functions; neither accused nor complainant can choose the investigating agency, and High Courts cannot direct investigations on anonymous petitions or convert themselves into “police stations.”
• On public interest litigation, the Court stresses that only bona fide litigants with disclosed identity and sufficient interest should be entertained; anonymous or unverified letters cannot be used to initiate PIL-styled criminal investigations, and High Courts must guard against “masked phantoms” misusing PIL for oblique motives.

 

Obiter dicta

• Important obiter clarifies that while in exceptional cases the High Court may, under Article 226, interfere with an investigation for proven mala fides or abuse, even then it cannot dictate how the investigation is conducted, only insist on compliance with the Code.
• The Court lays down institutional guidance: Chief Justice is master of the roster; individual judges should not unilaterally act on letters personally addressed to them, and all such communications must be placed before the Chief Justice to decide if and how they should be treated.

The judgment underlines that courts must protect their own institutional integrity and reputation by resisting attempts by unscrupulous litigants to drag them into inquisitorial roles beyond the constitutional design

Birendra Kumar Pandey and Another v. Union of India and Another Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 28 of 2012

 Case name: Birendra Kumar Pandey and Another v. Union of India and Another

Citation: Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 28 of 2012, Supreme Court of India

Date of final order: 8 June 2023

Bench / Judges: Vikram Nath, J. and Sanjay Kumar, J. (vacation bench at final disposal); interim proceedings earlier before Altamas Kabir, J. and J. Chelameswar, J.

Facts

The petitioners were issued summons under section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962, for interrogation by customs authorities in connection with an investigation. They feared coercive methods and possible extortion of confessions during questioning, and therefore filed a writ petition under Article 32 seeking a direction that their interrogation and recording of statements under section 108 be conducted in the presence of their advocate, at a visible but beyond‑audibility distance. On 16 April 2012, the Supreme Court, by an interim order, granted this protective arrangement during interrogation. The petition later came up for final disposal in 2023.

Judgment / Holding

The Court noted that the interim order of 16 April 2012 had already granted the precise relief sought in the writ petition, namely, presence of the petitioners’ advocate during interrogation within sight but beyond hearing range and without participation in questioning. Since nothing more survived for adjudication, the writ petition was disposed of in terms of the signed order, without granting any wider declaration of right beyond the specific protection already afforded.

Observations and Obiter dicta

• While considering the interim relief, the Court distinguished Poolpandi v. Superintendent, Central Excise, where presence of counsel “during” interrogation as an active participant was refused, from a limited safeguard permitting counsel to sit at a visible but non‑audible distance to prevent coercion.
• Relying on Jugal Kishore Samra and D.K. Basu directions, the Court treated such limited presence of counsel as a reasonable protective measure in appropriate cases, clarifying that the lawyer has no role in the interrogation itself and cannot consult the person during questioning.

Babu Singh and Others v. The State of Uttar Pradesh​ 1978 AIR 527

Case name: Babu Singh and Others v. The State of Uttar Pradesh​

Citation: 1978 AIR 527; 1978 SCR (2) 777; 1978 SCC (1) 579​

Date of judgment: 31 January 1978​

Bench / Judges: V. R. Krishna Iyer, J. (speaking for the Court) with D. A. Desai, J. on the Bench​

Facts 

The petitioners were charged with murder under section 302 IPC and were acquitted by the Sessions Judge on 4 November 1972. The State appealed; after about five years, on 20 May 1977, the High Court reversed the acquittal, convicted all petitioners and sentenced them to life imprisonment. The petitioners filed a statutory appeal to the Supreme Court and sought bail pending appeal. An earlier bail application had been rejected on 7 September 1977, but they moved a second application pointing to long delay, prior acquittal, their conduct while on bail, family circumstances, and time already spent in custody.​

Judgment and holding

The Court held that rejection of an earlier bail application does not bar a subsequent application if there are new materials or developments, and bail can be reconsidered at a later stage. Emphasising that personal liberty under Article 21 is a fundamental value and that bail refusal cannot be used punitively, the Court granted bail subject to strict conditions, including a bond, surety, exclusion from the concerned village, and weekly reporting to the local police station.​

Observations / Obiter dicta

• The Court elaborated a constitutional, rights‑oriented “jurisprudence of bail,” stressing that deprivation of liberty is justified only on reasonable grounds tied to community safety and securing the accused’s presence, not as anticipatory punishment.​
• It identified key bail factors: nature of charge and evidence, severity of possible sentence, likelihood of absconding, risk of tampering with evidence or threatening witnesses, antecedents, period already spent in custody, delay in hearing appeals, and the harsh conditions of prisons.​
• The Court endorsed the view that where appeals cannot be disposed of reasonably quickly, persons sentenced to life imprisonment and granted special leave should ordinarily be released on bail unless there are cogent reasons to refuse.