Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and Others v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 565

 Case name: Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and Others v. State of Punjab

Citation: (1980) 2 SCC 565; AIR 1980 SC 1632; 1980 (3) SCR 383​

Date of judgment: 9 April 1980​

Bench / Judges: Y. V. Chandrachud, C.J., and P. N. Bhagwati, N. L. Untwalia, R. S. Pathak and O. Chinnappa Reddy, JJ. (judgment by Chandrachud, C.J.)​

 

Facts

Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia, then Punjab Minister for Irrigation and Power, and others faced grave allegations of political corruption and anticipated arrest on non‑bailable charges including criminal breach of trust. They moved the Punjab & Haryana High Court under section 438 CrPC seeking anticipatory bail. A Full Bench dismissed their applications and, in the process, laid down eight restrictive propositions: that section 438 power is “extraordinary,” to be used only in exceptional cases; that conditions of section 437 are implicit; that “special case” must be shown; that anticipatory bail is virtually barred in life‑sentence offences and serious economic offences, and cannot be granted on mere general allegations of mala fides. Multiple appeals by special leave came before the Supreme Court.​

 

Judgment / Holding

The Supreme Court substantially set aside the Full Bench ruling and held that section 438 confers a broad discretionary power on the High Court and Court of Session which must not be cut down by importing section 437 limitations or the High Court’s rigid propositions. It ruled that anticipatory bail is a statutory, pre‑arrest protection of personal liberty, not confined to “exceptional cases,” and that courts must decide case‑by‑case using usual bail considerations (nature of accusation, antecedents, risk of absconding, tampering, public interest), imposing suitable conditions under section 438(2). The Court clarified that anticipatory bail can be granted even before FIR (if reasonable apprehension of arrest exists), or after FIR till arrest, but not after arrest, when sections 437/439 apply. The appeals were allowed in part and the restrictive Full Bench propositions disapproved.​

 

Key observations

• Section 438 is a procedural safeguard intimately linked to Article 21; since denial of bail is deprivation of liberty, courts must “lean against” unnecessary judicial restrictions not found in the text, otherwise the provision risks constitutional invalidity.​
• The Court rejected a rigid requirement that anticipatory bail be confined to mala fide accusations, or that it be barred in offences punishable with death or life imprisonment; instead, discretion must remain flexible, guided but not fettered by general bail principles.​
• A “blanket” anticipatory bail order (covering all future offences or unspecified accusations) is impermissible; the order must be tied to specific apprehended offences, to avoid becoming a charter of lawlessness or disabling police investigation.​

 

Obiter dicta

• The judgment stresses that judicial discretion in bail matters should not be strait‑jacketed by judge‑made “codes”; broad guidelines may be framed but life’s variability requires leaving “free play in the joints” for higher courts to respond to unforeseen situations.​
• It emphasises that anticipatory bail does not impede investigation: conditions can ensure cooperation, prevent tampering, and even allow limited police custody for discoveries under section 27 of the Evidence Act, preserving the complementary roles of police and judiciary.​
• The Court cautions against class‑based assumptions (that the rich will stay, the poor will abscond) and reaffirms that equality before law requires bail decisions to focus on objective risk factors, not status, even while acknowledging that misuse of criminal law for political vendetta justifies the availability of anticipatory bail.​