Joginder Singh v. State (Delhi Administration) (1994) 4 SCC 724

 

Case name: Joginder Singh v. State (Delhi Administration)

Citation: (1994) 4 SCC 724; also noted at (1994) 3 SCC 569; JT 1994 (2) SC 423​

Date of judgment: 19 April 1994​

Bench / Judges: S. C. Agrawal, J. and A. S. Anand, J.​

 

Facts

The appellant, Joginder Singh, was prosecuted before the Designated Court, Delhi, for an offence punishable under section 5 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (TADA), relating to unauthorised possession of specified arms or ammunition in notified areas. The Designated Court convicted him under section 5 TADA and sentenced him to five years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000, with two months’ further RI in default. In an appeal to the Supreme Court, the main contention was that his conviction could not be sustained in view of the interpretation of Section 5 TADA by the Constitution Bench in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab.​

 

Judgment / Holding

The Court noted that in Kartar Singh, R. M. Sahai, J. had taken the view that section 5 of TADA can be invoked only if there is material to show that the arms or ammunition were likely to be used for, or had been used in, terrorist or disruptive activities, while the other four Judges did not expressly decide the precise scope of section 5. Observing that the issue of the correct interpretation of section 5 TADA arises in a large number of cases and is of considerable importance, the Court did not finally decide the appeal but directed that the question of the true ambit of section 5 TADA be placed before a three‑judge bench for authoritative determination, granting liberty to mention the appeal for hearing after such reference.​

 

Key observations

• The order records that there is uncertainty whether the restrictive construction of section 5 TADA by Sahai, J., in Kartar Singh represents the binding ratio of the Constitution Bench, since the remaining Judges did not concur or elaborate on that point.​
• Recognising the widespread impact of section 5 TADA prosecutions, the Court emphasises the need for a clear, larger‑bench ruling rather than resolving the issue in a two‑judge bench appeal, thereby prioritising doctrinal clarity over immediate disposal.​

 

Obiter dicta

• Implicit in the order is the principle that when different opinions emerge from a larger Bench on an important statutory provision, and its application affects numerous pending cases, a smaller Bench should refer the question for reconsideration or clarification rather than adopt one view without full discussion.​
• The Court’s approach reflects a cautionary stance in applying severe special‑statute provisions like TADA without a settled interpretation, signalling the importance of strict construction and robust precedent in matters involving serious curtailment of personal liberty.​