Case name: Nandini Satpathy v. P. L. Dani and Another
Citation:
(1978) 2 SCC 424; AIR 1978 SC 1025; (1978) 3 SCR 608
Date of
judgment: 7 April 1978
Bench /
Judges: V. R. Krishna Iyer, J. (delivering the judgment of the Court), with
Jaswant Singh and V. D. Tulzapurkar, JJ. on the Bench
Facts
Nandini
Satpathy, former Chief Minister of Odisha, was named as an accused in a
vigilance FIR alleging possession of assets disproportionate to known sources
of income and offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act and sections 161,
165, 120‑B and 109 IPC. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance,
summoned her to the police station (contrary to section 160 CrPC’s protection
for women) and gave her a long written questionnaire to be answered orally
under section 161 CrPC. She declined to answer many questions, invoking Article
20(3) (right against self‑incrimination) and section 161(2) CrPC. The officer
then filed a complaint under section 179 IPC (refusal to state the truth to a
public servant), the Magistrate took cognizance, and the High Court refused to
quash. She appealed to the Supreme Court.
Judgment / Holding
The Supreme
Court allowed the appeals and quashed the section 179 IPC prosecution, holding
that the protection against self‑incrimination in Article 20(3) extends to
police interrogation and substantially overlaps with the immunity in section
161(2) CrPC. It ruled that “any person” in section 161 includes an accused or
suspect, and that questions whose answers have a “reasonable and real” tendency
to expose the person to a criminal charge (in the same or other
pending/imminent cases) may be refused. The Court emphasised that section 179
IPC contains a mens rea element and should not be used promiscuously to coerce
answers where an accused reasonably claims constitutional immunity. Given the
unclear state of law and her counsel’s undertaking that she would answer all
non‑incriminatory questions, the Court directed that she be examined only in
terms of the section 160 proviso (at her residence) and that the prosecution be
quashed.
Key observations
- Article 20(3) applies not only at trial
but from the stage of police investigation; “to be a witness against
himself” covers any compelled testimony, not just formal court evidence,
and includes answers that provide a real link in the chain of proof towards
guilt, not merely full confessions.
- Section 161(2) CrPC is treated as a
“parliamentary gloss” on Article 20(3): both protect against compelled
answers that have a reasonable tendency to expose a person to a criminal
charge, including in other proceedings, while still obliging truthful answers
to genuinely non‑incriminatory relevant questions.
- The Court strongly criticises third‑degree
methods and “psychic” or subtle pressure in police stations, stressing
that compulsion under Article 20(3) includes mental and environmental
coercion, and that women cannot be required to attend police stations
under section 160 CrPC; breach merits disciplinary action.
Obiter dicta
- The Court suggests that, while the police
are not required to provide a lawyer, if an accused requests the presence
of counsel during “near‑custodial” interrogation, that facility should
normally be allowed; lawyers may quietly advise but not “harangue” the
police, and their presence helps ensure observance of the right to
silence.
- It recommends practical safeguards:
informing the accused of the right to silence and recording that warning;
and, where no lawyer is available, taking the accused after questioning to
a Magistrate, doctor or responsible independent person for a confidential
audience to report any duress, with a brief record sent to a Magistrate
rather than the police.
- The judgment articulates that suspects
“embryonically” accused in other serious investigations may reasonably
fear self‑incrimination from otherwise neutral questions, and courts must
consider the full factual matrix and give the benefit of reasonable doubt
in favour of the privilege, while rejecting fanciful or remote
apprehensions.
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