Salient Features AND Objective of National Environment Policy (NEP), 2006

 

Salient Features of National Environment Policy (NEP), 2006

The NEP 2006 is India’s first comprehensive policy that consolidates previous sectoral policies and integrates sustainable development into planning.

Key Features:

1.     Conservation of Critical Environmental Resources:

• Focus on forests, wildlife, water resources, biodiversity, and ecological sensitive zones.

2.     Integration of Environmental Concerns in Economic and Social Development:

• Environmental sustainability to be embedded in all developmental processes.

3.     Intra-generational and Inter-generational Equity:

• Ensuring environmental justice to present and future generations.

4.     Polluter Pays Principle and Precautionary Principle:

• Adoption of key environmental principles to ensure accountability.

5.     Use of Economic Instruments:

• Promotion of market-based tools like carbon trading, green taxes, and subsidies for clean technologies.

6.     Decentralisation and Local Governance:

• Strengthening Panchayati Raj and local bodies for better implementation of environmental programmes.

7.     Enhancing Environmental Awareness:

• Promoting environmental education, awareness, and participation at all levels.

8.     Public Participation and Transparency:

• Inclusive decision-making through access to environmental information and public hearings.

9.     Strengthening Environmental Institutions:

• Capacity building of pollution control boards, ministries, and other regulatory bodies.

10.  Special Attention to Vulnerable Groups:

• Focus on tribal communities, coastal populations, and women affected by environmental degradation.

 

Conclusion:

India’s environmental policy has moved from spiritual reverence to legal and institutional frameworks. The NEP 2006 provides a comprehensive and forward-looking approach, emphasizing sustainable development, equity, and participatory governance. However, effective implementation remains a critical challenge.

Object of National Environmental Policy (NEP), 2006

The National Environmental Policy (NEP), 2006 is a comprehensive document by the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEFCC) that outlines India's environmental vision and policy framework. The policy aims to balance environmental conservation with economic development.

Key Objectives:

• Ensure sustainable development by integrating environmental concerns into decision-making across all sectors.
• Conserve critical environmental resources like forests, biodiversity, water, and air.
• Address pollution through technological innovation and market-based incentives.
• Ensure equitable access to environmental resources for all sections of society, especially marginalized communities.
• Promote the Precautionary Principle, Polluter Pays Principle, and Public Trust Doctrine.

It also emphasizes the role of community participation, recognizing the knowledge and rights of tribal and forest-dwelling communities. The policy encourages decentralization and involvement of local bodies in environmental management.

The NEP 2006 reflects India's commitments under international environmental conventions such as the Convention on Biological Diversity, UNFCCC, and Agenda 21.

The policy provides a strategic framework for future environmental legislation and management programs. Though not legally binding, it serves as a guiding document for ministries, state governments, and local authorities to adopt eco-sensitive practices.

By addressing environmental protection through a development-oriented approach, the NEP 2006 seeks to promote inter-generational equity and ecological sustainability as key pillars of India’s growth model.

 

 

Kinds of Pollution

 Pollution refers to the contamination (making dirty) of the natural environment resulting in adverse effects on living beings and the ecosystem.

Environmental pollution refers to the contamination of natural resources due to harmful substances, adversely affecting living organisms and ecosystems. The major types of environmental pollution include:

1.     Air Pollution – Caused by industrial emissions, vehicle exhausts, burning of fossil fuels, etc. It includes pollutants like carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and particulate matter. It leads to respiratory diseases, global warming, and acid rain.
Case: M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (Vehicular Pollution case), AIR 1999 SC 301.

2.     Water Pollution – Discharge of untreated industrial effluents, sewage, and chemicals into water bodies. It affects aquatic life and human health.
Case: M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (Ganga Pollution Case), AIR 1988 SC 1037.

3.     Soil Pollution – Due to overuse of pesticides, fertilizers, industrial waste disposal, and deforestation. It degrades soil fertility and contaminates crops.

4.     Noise Pollution – Arises from loudspeakers, vehicles, industrial machines, and construction work. It affects mental health and leads to hearing loss.
Case: In Re: Noise Pollution – Implementation of the Laws, (2005) 5 SCC 733.

5.     Thermal and Radioactive Pollution – Release of heat and radioactive substances by power plants and nuclear industries affect ecosystems and cause genetic damage.

6.     Plastic and Solid Waste Pollution – Non-biodegradable waste clogs drains and pollutes land and water.

Each kind of pollution affects the environment and public health, violating Article 21 of the Constitution. Preventive and remedial measures are essential through legislation like the Environment Protection Act, 1986 and judicial activism.

Prem Prakash v. Union of India through Directorate of Enforcement 2024 INSC 637

 Case name: Prem Prakash v. Union of India through Directorate of Enforcement

Citation: 2024 INSC 637; Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 5416 of 2024, Supreme Court of India​

Date of judgment: 28 August 2024​

Bench / Judges: B. R. Gavai and K. V. Viswanathan, JJ. (judgment by K. V. Viswanathan, J.)​

 

Facts

An FIR (Sadar P.S. Case No. 399 of 2022, Ranchi) alleged that a one‑acre plot at Cheshire Home Road, Ranchi, was fraudulently acquired through forged title documents and sham sale transactions involving various accused; the FIR did not name Prem Prakash. Since sections 420 and 467 IPC are scheduled offences, the Enforcement Directorate (ED) registered ECIR No. 5 of 2023 under the PMLA. ED alleged that ₹1.01 crore out of the sale consideration flowed, via accounts of Punit Bhargava, to M/s Jamini Enterprises, said to be beneficially owned by Prem Prakash, and that he used his connections to get the land mutated and facilitate the deal. He was arrayed as A‑8, arrested on 11 August 2023 (while already in custody in another ECIR), and his bail application under section 45 PMLA was rejected by the Special Court and by the Jharkhand High Court.​

 

Judgment / Holding

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court’s order dated 22 March 2024, and directed that Prem Prakash be released on bail in ECIR No. 5 of 2023 on furnishing a bond of ₹5 lakh with two sureties, subject to conditions (surrender of passport, weekly reporting to the IO, and non‑tampering with evidence). Applying section 45 PMLA in light of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and Manish Sisodia (II), the Court held that there were reasonable grounds to believe the appellant was not guilty of the alleged money‑laundering offence and was not likely to commit any offence while on bail, particularly given over a year’s incarceration, non‑commencement of trial, and weak material linking him to the forged sale deed or “proceeds of crime.”​

 

Key observations

• The Court reaffirmed that even under PMLA “bail is the rule, jail the exception,” as a facet of Article 21, and that section 45 imposes stringent but not absolute restraints; courts at the bail stage need only form a prima facie view on “reasonable grounds for believing” based on probabilities, not proof beyond reasonable doubt.​
• It stressed that under section 24 PMLA the prosecution must first establish three foundational facts (existence of scheduled crime, derivation of property as proceeds of crime, and the accused’s involvement in a process or activity connected with such proceeds) before the statutory presumption and twin conditions can operate.​
• The Court held that statements of the appellant recorded under section 50 PMLA while he was already in judicial custody in another ED case are hit by section 25 of the Evidence Act and cannot be used against him, and that co‑accused statements (e.g., Afshar Ali, Saddam Hussain) have only limited corroborative value akin to section 30 Evidence Act.​

 

Obiter dicta

• The judgment clarifies that when a person is in custody in one PMLA case, any statement the same agency records under section 50 in another ECIR cannot safely be treated as voluntary; to admit it against the maker would offend fair‑procedure requirements under Article 21 and the protective logic of section 25 Evidence Act.​
• It emphasises the importance of detailed, case‑specific counter‑affidavits by ED in bail matters, explaining how the three foundational facts are made out, rather than relying on generic assertions; only then can the presumption under section 24 shift the burden to the accused.​
• Relying on recent PMLA bail decisions, the Court reiterates that prolonged pre‑trial custody, especially where trial is nowhere near conclusion and the case does not involve extreme offences or massive public victimisation, should weigh heavily in favour of conditional liberty; pre‑trial detention must not become “punishment without trial.”​

Pravin C. Shah v. K. A. Mohd. Ali and Another Civil Appeal No. 3050 of 2000; reported as (2001) 8 SCC 650

 

Case name: Pravin C. Shah v. K. A. Mohd. Ali and Another

Citation: Civil Appeal No. 3050 of 2000; reported as (2001) 8 SCC 650​

Date of judgment: 9 October 2001​

Bench / Judges: K. T. Thomas and S. N. Variava, JJ. (judgment by K. T. Thomas, J.)​

 

Facts

The respondent, an advocate practising in Ernakulam, was twice found guilty of criminal contempt by the Kerala High Court and convicted under section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, with fines imposed; his challenges in the Supreme Court failed save for deletion of one fine, and his apology was expressly rejected. Despite this, he continued to appear and argue cases. On a complaint by a residents’ association represented by the appellant, the Bar Council of Kerala initiated disciplinary proceedings and ordered that he be debarred from acting or pleading in any court until he purged himself of contempt as per Rule 11 of the Kerala High Court Rules under section 34(1) of the Advocates Act. The Bar Council of India, on appeal, set aside this order, holding Rule 11 inapplicable as it allegedly usurped Bar Council powers. The association appealed to the Supreme Court.​

 

Judgment/Holdingthe 

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and restored the effect of Rule 11, holding that it is a self‑operating rule framed by the High Court to regulate appearance and conduct of advocates in court and does not trench upon the Bar Councils’ disciplinary jurisdiction over the right to practise. Once an advocate is found guilty of contempt, his right to appear, act or plead in any court within the High Court’s jurisdiction stands automatically suspended until he purges himself of contempt by genuine remorse and acceptance of apology by the competent court; mere undergoing of sentence or payment of fine is insufficient. The Bar Council of India erred in treating Rule 11 as unconstitutional or as an encroachment on its autonomy; courts retain supervisory control over who appears before them to protect their dignity and orderly functioning. The Court directed Registrars to inform all subordinate courts whenever an advocate is convicted for contempt so that the interdict is enforced until purge.​

 

Key observations

• The Court distinguished between the “right to practise” (a broader genus regulated by Bar Councils, including drafting, advising, etc.) and the “right to appear and conduct cases in court” (a species subject to the court’s own control via rules under section 34 Advocates Act).​
• Rule 11 concerns only in‑court appearance of an advocate found guilty of contempt; it does not impose disciplinary punishment or affect chamber practice, so it does not violate Articles 14, 19(1)(g) or 21.​
• Purging contempt in criminal contempt cases requires more than completion of sentence: it needs real contrition, a sincere apology accepted by the court through an order acknowledging purge; only then does the bar on appearance cease.​

 

Obiter dicta

• The judgment stresses that allowing a recently convicted contemnor to stand and argue in the same courts, “unaffected” by his contumacious conduct, would erode public confidence, corrode the court’s majesty, and undermine the justice system; hence courts must retain strict control over courtroom conduct.​
• It explains that disciplinary powers of Bar Councils (suspending or removing an advocate’s licence) and courts’ contempt powers (including restricting appearance until purge) are “separate and distinct” jurisdictions, both validly co‑existing under Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India.​
• The Court clarifies that apologies offered merely as a device to avoid punishment, without genuine remorse, do not amount to purging contempt, citing earlier cases like M. Y. Shareef, Mulk Raj, and M. B. Sanghi, and that “soft justice” in such situations is inappropriate.​

Nandini Satpathy v. P. L. Dani and Another (1978) 2 SCC 424

 Case name: Nandini Satpathy v. P. L. Dani and Another

Citation: (1978) 2 SCC 424; AIR 1978 SC 1025; (1978) 3 SCR 608​

Date of judgment: 7 April 1978​

Bench / Judges: V. R. Krishna Iyer, J. (delivering the judgment of the Court), with Jaswant Singh and V. D. Tulzapurkar, JJ. on the Bench​

 

Facts

Nandini Satpathy, former Chief Minister of Odisha, was named as an accused in a vigilance FIR alleging possession of assets disproportionate to known sources of income and offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act and sections 161, 165, 120‑B and 109 IPC. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance, summoned her to the police station (contrary to section 160 CrPC’s protection for women) and gave her a long written questionnaire to be answered orally under section 161 CrPC. She declined to answer many questions, invoking Article 20(3) (right against self‑incrimination) and section 161(2) CrPC. The officer then filed a complaint under section 179 IPC (refusal to state the truth to a public servant), the Magistrate took cognizance, and the High Court refused to quash. She appealed to the Supreme Court.​

 

Judgment / Holding

The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and quashed the section 179 IPC prosecution, holding that the protection against self‑incrimination in Article 20(3) extends to police interrogation and substantially overlaps with the immunity in section 161(2) CrPC. It ruled that “any person” in section 161 includes an accused or suspect, and that questions whose answers have a “reasonable and real” tendency to expose the person to a criminal charge (in the same or other pending/imminent cases) may be refused. The Court emphasised that section 179 IPC contains a mens rea element and should not be used promiscuously to coerce answers where an accused reasonably claims constitutional immunity. Given the unclear state of law and her counsel’s undertaking that she would answer all non‑incriminatory questions, the Court directed that she be examined only in terms of the section 160 proviso (at her residence) and that the prosecution be quashed.​

 

Key observations

• Article 20(3) applies not only at trial but from the stage of police investigation; “to be a witness against himself” covers any compelled testimony, not just formal court evidence, and includes answers that provide a real link in the chain of proof towards guilt, not merely full confessions.​
• Section 161(2) CrPC is treated as a “parliamentary gloss” on Article 20(3): both protect against compelled answers that have a reasonable tendency to expose a person to a criminal charge, including in other proceedings, while still obliging truthful answers to genuinely non‑incriminatory relevant questions.​
• The Court strongly criticises third‑degree methods and “psychic” or subtle pressure in police stations, stressing that compulsion under Article 20(3) includes mental and environmental coercion, and that women cannot be required to attend police stations under section 160 CrPC; breach merits disciplinary action.​

 

Obiter dicta

• The Court suggests that, while the police are not required to provide a lawyer, if an accused requests the presence of counsel during “near‑custodial” interrogation, that facility should normally be allowed; lawyers may quietly advise but not “harangue” the police, and their presence helps ensure observance of the right to silence.​
• It recommends practical safeguards: informing the accused of the right to silence and recording that warning; and, where no lawyer is available, taking the accused after questioning to a Magistrate, doctor or responsible independent person for a confidential audience to report any duress, with a brief record sent to a Magistrate rather than the police.​
• The judgment articulates that suspects “embryonically” accused in other serious investigations may reasonably fear self‑incrimination from otherwise neutral questions, and courts must consider the full factual matrix and give the benefit of reasonable doubt in favour of the privilege, while rejecting fanciful or remote apprehensions.​
  
  

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248

 

Case name: Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India

Citation: (1978) 1 SCC 248; AIR 1978 SC 597; (1978) 2 SCR 621​

Date of judgment: 25 January 1978​

Bench / Judges: M. Hameedullah Beg, C.J., and Y. V. Chandrachud, P. N. Bhagwati, V. R. Krishna Iyer, N. L. Untwalia, Syed Murtaza Fazal Ali and P. S. Kailasam, JJ. (leading judgment by Bhagwati, J.; concurring opinions by others)​

 

Facts

Maneka Gandhi was issued an Indian passport on 1 June 1976 under the Passports Act, 1967. On 2 July 1977, the Regional Passport Officer informed her that the Government of India had decided to impound her passport under section 10(3)(c) “in public interest” and required her to surrender it within seven days. When she asked for the reasons under section 10(5), the Government replied that, “in the interest of the general public,” the statement of reasons would not be furnished. She filed a writ petition under Article 32 challenging the constitutional validity of sections 10(3)(c) and 10(5), the impounding order, and the denial of reasons, alleging violations of Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 19(1)(g) and 21 and breach of natural justice.​

 

Judgment / Holding

The Court held that the “right to travel abroad” is part of “personal liberty” under Article 21, so deprivation of that right must follow a law which prescribes a procedure that is fair, just and reasonable, not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive. Overruling the earlier “watertight compartment” view in A. K. Gopalan, it held that laws affecting personal liberty must also satisfy Articles 14 and 19: Article 21’s “procedure established by law” is controlled by the requirements of non‑arbitrariness and reasonableness. Section 10(3)(c) and section 10(5) were upheld on a constitution‑conforming interpretation: power to impound must be exercised on relevant grounds, with an opportunity of hearing (pre‑ or promptly post‑decisional), and reasons must normally be disclosed, refusal being justified only in rare cases where disclosure itself would harm interests expressly protected in the statute. In Maneka Gandhi’s specific case, the Court found denial of reasons and absence of hearing inconsistent with fair procedure and quashed the impounding order, but, in view of an undertaking given by the Attorney General to provide a hearing and reconsider, disposed of the petition without a formal writ, directing that the passport remain with the Court pending governmental reconsideration.​

 

Key observations

• The Court gave Article 21 a wide meaning: “personal liberty” is of the “widest amplitude” and includes a range of rights (like the right to travel abroad), some separately protected in Article 19; Articles 14, 19 and 21 form an integrated scheme, and any law depriving liberty must be “right, just and fair,” and non‑arbitrary.​
• It rejected the “direct object” test of Gopalan and adopted the “direct and inevitable effect” / “intended and real effect” doctrine (building on R. C. Cooper and Bennett Coleman), holding that State action must be tested for its real impact on fundamental rights rather than its form or ostensible purpose.​
• The Court also held that freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a), and the right to practice a profession under Article 19(1)(g), are not geographically confined to India; State action within India that prevents expression or professional activity abroad can still violate these rights.​

 

Obiter dicta

• The judgment elaborates that Articles 19 and 21 are not mutually exclusive; in “unoccupied” areas of personal liberty outside Article 22, both substantive and procedural law must satisfy Articles 14 and 19, not only the bare text of Article 21.​
• It affirms that principles of natural justice apply not only to quasi‑judicial but also to administrative actions affecting rights: even where statutes are silent, a duty to act fairly and give a reasonable opportunity to be heard will normally be implied, subject only to exceptional situations of genuine urgency where a prompt post‑decisional hearing may suffice.​
• Multiple opinions warn against broad, unguided executive discretions in matters like passports, emphasising transparency, recorded reasons, and judicial review as safeguards against arbitrary or politically motivated restrictions on movement, expression and profession.​